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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

APPRENDI-LAND OPENS ITS BORDERS: WILL THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION IN SOUTHERN UNION CO. V. UNITED STATES
EXTEND APPRENDI’S REACH TO RESTITUTION?

INTRODUCTION
The right to a trial by jury has ancient roots in the Anglo-American legal
system, being included in Magna Carta in 1215,1 and later codified in the Bill
of Rights of the United States Constitution.2 The right to a trial by jury has
been called “the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties,”3 requiring
that “the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a defendant ‘should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours.’”4 When attempting to delineate the boundaries of this right, the
tension between the government and its citizens is highlighted. The
government has a strong interest in establishing and overseeing its regime of
criminal law, empowering its judges and officers, as well as enabling its
legislature to pass laws proscribing certain behavior and determining the
appropriate punishment for violating these laws. However, a citizen’s right to
know what behavior is prohibited and when and how the punishment for such
behavior will be determined and distributed, as well as a fundamental right to
fairness in the criminal process is well-documented.5 Due to the fundamental
nature of the powers in question, the interests of the government and its
citizens can often be found squarely at odds with each other along this
spectrum.
The U.S. Supreme Court shifted this balance of power in Apprendi v. New
Jersey,6 where it held for the first time that any fact relied upon to increase a

1. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84 (1942) (“Since it was first recognized in Magna
Carta, trial by jury has been a prized shield against oppression . . . .”).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
3. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540
(4th ed. 1873).
4. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)).
5. See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 335 (2005) (defining and describing the “principle of legality”). Robinson describes
the “principle of legality” as the proposition that “criminal liability and punishment can be based
only upon a prior legislative enactment of a prohibition that is expressed with adequate precision
and clarity.” Id. at 336.
6. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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sentence beyond the maximum prescribed by statute must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.7 This was a radical departure from established law
to that point; the dissent in Apprendi complained that the Court had baselessly
altered a significant paradigm of criminal law, taking away judicial discretion
and limiting the options available to Congress and state legislatures to define
criminal offenses and their sentences.8 The Court found that the common-law
requirement that an “indictment must allege whatever is in law essential to the
punishment sought to be inflicted” was a controlling concept in the United
States’ history of criminal law and punishment,9 and the result was a brightline rule that would be viewed as a “revolution in sentencing.”10 And so,
“Apprendi-land”11 was born.
Like many other constitutional issues, Apprendi’s rule presented a matter
of balancing the government’s interests with its citizens’ interest in a
constitutionally protected right. The government’s interest at stake is by no
means inconsequential; Apprendi implicates long-standing norms in judicial
discretion and Congressional powers to legislate,12 but there is a significant
interest in efficiency and practicality as well.13 This is counter-balanced by a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, as well as the interest in
receiving a punishment based upon a statute.14 Additionally a defendant has a
constitutionally protected interest in a jury verdict where one is required, as
opposed to the whim of the judge, who is no more qualified than a jury to
accurately and efficiently determine the facts required for conviction.15 While
Apprendi certainly shifted this balance of power, this debate has continued in

7. Id. at 490.
8. Id. at 524–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
9. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50
(2d ed. 1872). See also id. at 51 (“[T]he indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which
is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.”). The Court in Apprendi cited to several
high state courts from the same time period that cited to and approved of this definition.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 511–12.
10. See, e.g., LAURIE L. LEVENSON & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, THE RUTTER GROUPCALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1:4 (2012–2013).
11. The term “Apprendi-land” was coined by Justice Scalia. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong flight; he
should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Apprendi-land.”).
12. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s rule
as encroaching upon accepted powers and practices of judges).
13. Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority’s rule was “impractical” and
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, as well as potentially leading to unwanted and
disparate outcomes in criminal trials).
14. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Apprendi contemplates the legality principle when he
says “[under Apprendi’s rule,] the criminal will never get more punishment than he bargained for
when he did the crime.” Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. Id.
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the discussion of a variety of topics, from the potential imposition of the death
penalty, to the imposition of criminal fines and restitution.
This interplay between judge, jury, defendant, and victim is especially
complex in the context of criminal restitution. While the current federal
restitution statutes are found in the criminal code,16 there has been debate as to
whether restitution is a criminal punishment that furthers the traditional
punitive goals of deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, or if it is simply a
civil remedy intended only to make the victim “whole.”17 Beyond this
threshold question of whether restitution is even a “criminal” remedy is the
issue of how restitution orders are authorized and determined under the federal
restitution statutes.18 The mere fact that restitution exists is not what prompts a
potential Apprendi issue; the problem lies in the way that restitution is
determined. Under the current federal restitution framework, certain classes of
offenses will require a judge to make a mandatory order of restitution upon a
guilty verdict or plea.19 Moreover, these orders need not be supported by any
facts from the trial, or guilty plea, or even the elements of the crime in
question; the court on its own initiative finds these facts on a simple
preponderance of the evidence standard.20 Seeing as restitution orders can be
millions of dollars or more,21 this is not an insignificant issue.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I is devoted to background,
with respect to both restitution generally and the genesis of the rule of
Apprendi. Part I.A will provide a short survey of both the history and current
state of criminal restitution in the United States, including a discussion of the
major federal restitution statutes that are applicable today. Additionally, Part
I.A will discuss the mechanics of restitution hearings. Part I.B will introduce
the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, including its function, purpose, and
importance. It will also set the stage for the discussion of Apprendi’s

16. Both the Victim Witness Protection Act (VWPA) and Mandatory Victim Restitution Act
(MVRA) are codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A–3664.
17. Compare Brian Kleinhaus, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil
Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement
Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2762–63, 2766–67 (2005)
(concluding that federal restitution statutes should be uniformly considered as means of criminal
punishment, not a solely civil remedy), with Matthew Spohn, A Statutory Chameleon: The
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act’s Challenge to the Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 IOWA L. REV.
1013, 1036–40 (2001). See also infra Part III.A.
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (requiring mandatory restitution for certain offenses, including
crimes of violence and title 18 property offenses).
20. See infra Part I.A.2.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012) (using the Mandatory
Victim Restitution Act to order more than six million dollars in restitution against defendant that
was found guilty of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and various other
offenses).
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subsequent line of cases in Part II. Part II will provide a summary of the
Court’s holdings in these cases, and isolate and analyze specific language in
these decisions that suggest their eventual application to the facts underlying
criminal restitution. Specifically, the evolution of several terms of art used by
the Court in these decisions will be analyzed with an eye towards their future
application to criminal restitution. Finally, Part III will consolidate the
holdings in the Apprendi line of cases, and argue that the rule of these cases
logically and rightfully extends to cover criminal restitution. Part III will also
analyze and refute the common arguments put forth by the circuits of the
United States Court of Appeals against applying Apprendi to criminal
restitution.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Restitution Generally: A Brief Overview22
1.

History and Contemporary Statutory Basis

The authorization and use of restitution in the United States’ federal
criminal system was infrequent through most of the twentieth century.23 This
infrequent use can be attributed to the lack of overt authority American courts
had before the 1980s, as restitution has no explicit basis in the United States
Constitution.24 Courts’ authority to order restitution is purely statutory, and
until 1982, the only federal statute authorizing restitution was the Federal
Probation Act of 1925 (FPA), which left any restitution order to the complete
discretion of the court.25 In 1982, Congress passed the Victim Witness
Protection Act (VWPA),26 which currently acts as the primary statutory source
for restitution as a component of a federal sentence. While the VWPA is the
courts’ underlying authority for restitution orders, Congress has since passed
several mandatory restitution provisions, including the Child Support Recovery
Act (CSRA),27 the Violence Against Women Act,28 and, most significantly, the

22. See Kleinhaus, supra note 17, at 2717–28 (giving a more detailed overview of the
history of restitution, both globally and in the United States).
23. See S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536 (“As
simple as the principle of restitution is, it lost its priority status in the sentencing procedures of
our federal courts long ago.”).
24. See generally U.S. CONST. (containing no explicit mention or authorization of restitution
as a remedy).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651–3656 (1982) (repealed 1984).
26. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–
1515, 3663, 3664 (2006)).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2006) (mandating restitution of child support payments due in all
convictions of willful failure to pay past due child support).
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Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA).29 Because the VWPA
was discretionary, federal judges ordered restitution in only 20.2% of all
cases,30 a proportion that Congress was not satisfied with, leading to the
passage of the MVRA.31
Under the MVRA, a restitution order must be issued to all identifiable
victims of certain crimes for the full amount of the victims’ physical and/or
economic losses, without consideration of the defendant’s economic
circumstances.32 If the underlying criminal act qualifies under the MVRA for
mandatory restitution, the government bears the burden of proving by only a
preponderance of the evidence the essential facts for determining a restitution
order;33 moreover, these facts are found solely by the judge at sentencing.34
2.

The Mechanics of Restitution at Sentencing35

The MVRA establishes procedures for issuing and enforcing a restitution
order. First, the court directs the probation officer to obtain and provide
information in the form of a pre-sentence report (PSR), which acts as the
primary record of fact during sentencing.36 Any dispute over the factual
findings in the PSR is determined at the judge’s sole discretion on a
preponderance of evidence standard.37 The PSR must also include a complete
accounting of each victim’s loss, the amount of restitution, if any, owed
pursuant to a plea agreement, and information relating to the defendant’s
economic status.38 After receiving the PSR, a judge may act solely on the basis
of the report, request additional documentation from either party, or conduct a

28. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (adding mandatory restitution for sexual
abuse, sexual exploitation of children, domestic violence, and telemarketing fraud) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 13925–14045d (2010)).
29. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (requiring mandatory restitution for certain
offenses, including crimes of violence and title 18 property offenses) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3664 (2002)).
30. See S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 13 (1996).
31. Id.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A; William Acker, Jr., The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is
Unconstitutional. Will Courts Say So After Southern Union v. United States?, 64 ALA. L. REV.
803, 811 (2013).
33. Id. § 3664(e).
34. Id.
35. See generally Acker, supra note 32, at 811–16 (discussing the procedure and
requirements of restitution orders made pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). Acker, supra note 32, at 813. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(B)
(2009) (“If the law permits restitution, the probation officer must conduct an investigation and
submit a report [containing] sufficient information for the court to order restitution.”).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (2006).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (2006); Acker, supra note 32, at 813.
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separate restitution hearing.39 The most important attribute of this procedure is
that at no time is a jury involved; it is all handled by the court on a
preponderance standard, and often times the PSR contains otherwise
inadmissible hearsay,40 facts neither presented to nor found by a jury during
trial,41 and facts not admitted to by the defendant in his or her plea
agreement.42 Further, these orders routinely mandate restitution for harms that,
while occurring during or as a result of the defendant’s conduct, were not
elements of the underlying offense the defendant was either convicted of or
pleaded guilty to committing.43
This imposition of restitution based solely on facts not presented to and
found by a jury on a preponderance standard is what makes this an issue of
constitutional law, as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Apprendi v. New
Jersey and its progeny illustrate.
B.

Apprendi: The “Animating Principle” of the Sixth Amendment is Born

The Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey was a landmark
in the law of criminal procedure. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held for the first
time that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases a
criminal penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to the jury to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.44 The defendant, Charles
Apprendi, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of second-degree weapons
offenses;45 however, the trial judge, using a preponderance of the evidence
standard at sentencing, found that Apprendi’s actions satisfied New Jersey’s
hate crime statute,46 and used that statute to “enhance” his sentence beyond the

39. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(4); Acker, supra note 32, at 814.
40. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 304 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part)
(describing presentence reports as “hearsay-riddled”).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Morganfield, 450 Fed. Appx. 400, 401 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding
no error where the district court relied upon factual findings in the PSR to determine the amount
of restitution, which was supplemented post-trial to include an FBI report and other supporting
documentation).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 65–66 (1st Cir. 2005) (“A PSR
generally bears ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to permit the district court to rely on it at
sentencing.’ The defendant may object to facts in the PSR, but ‘if his objections to the PSR are
merely rhetorical and unsupported by countervailing proof, the district court is entitled to rely on
the facts in the PSR.’” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 329
(5th Cir. 1998) (“Facts contained in a PSR are considered reliable and may be adopted without
further inquiry if the defendant fails to present competent rebuttal evidence. . . . Mere objections
do not suffice as competent rebuttal evidence.”).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046, 1054 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The text of the
VWPA [and] the MVRA . . . do[es] not limit restitution to the elements of the offense.”).
44. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
45. Id. at 469–70.
46. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 1999).
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statutory maximum for the second-degree weapons charge alone.47 The statute
in question provided a defendant the right to a jury trial, with proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard on the firearm charge.48 However, it also gave the
judge sole discretion in determining the crime’s motivation on a preponderance
standard, which could enhance the sentence under New Jersey’s hate crime
statute.49 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that the statute in
question violated Apprendi’s due process rights, as well as his Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury.50
This case was viewed by many as a “revolution” in sentencing,51 which the
Court justified by examining the “jury tradition that is an indispensable part of
our justice system.”52 This justification, referred to in later cases as Apprendi’s
“animating principle,”53 stemmed from the historic role of English trial judges
at common law, where the judge had “very little explicit discretion in
sentencing . . . . The judge was meant simply to impose that sentence [which
the criminal law in question specifically prescribed].”54 While acknowledging
that judges have had, and will continue to have, some discretion in
sentencing,55 the Court delineated more specifically the limits of judicial
discretion in criminal sentencing in American law as follows:
We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible
for judges to exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors
relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a judgment within the
range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this country
have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within
statutory limits in the individual case. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (“[B]oth before and since the American colonies became
a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which
[a judge could exercise wide discretion in determining] the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law” (emphasis added)).56

Equally important as to what the Court stated explicitly in Apprendi is
what it did not. The Court did not eliminate all judicial discretion at

47. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
48. Id. at 491.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 497.
51. See, e.g., LEVENSON & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 10.
52. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
53. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351 (2012) (affirming
Apprendi’s “animating principal” as “the preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark
between the State and the accused.”).
54. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
55. Id. at 481.
56. Id.
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sentencing.57 Nor did it restrict its holding to any one type or class of criminal
punishment; the trial court enhanced the defendant’s sentence to twelve years
(above the statutory maximum of ten years for that specific count of the
conviction) of incarceration, but the Court referred only to the increase of
“penalties” throughout its opinion.58 This reference to “penalties,” along with
the uncertain nature of what exactly is contemplated by the phrase “statutory
maximum,”59 opened the door to arguments in favor of expanding Apprendi’s
rule to explicitly encompass other specific criminal penalties that trial judges
before had nearly unfettered discretion at sentencing to determine within the
state’s existing statutory framework.
Even though the 5-4 decision was thought by some to be somewhat of an
aberration60 due in part to the unusual composition of the majority and
dissenting coalitions,61 it has proven to have staying power, evidenced by the
subsequent line of cases in the following years. These cases extended the jury
fact-finding requirement to capital cases,62 further (and more broadly) defined
the phrase “statutory maximum” with regards to its place in the Apprendi
doctrine,63 ended the mandatory nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,64
and extended the jury requirement to more categories of punishments,
including criminal fines.65 Moreover, while Apprendi’s language alone does
not offer an exceedingly persuasive argument for the expansion of its holding
to criminal restitution, the Court’s language in its subsequent Apprendi
jurisprudence does.66

57. Id.
58. Id. at 490.
59. Justice Breyer’s dissent discussed this ambiguity, stating that “the majority, in support of
its constitutional rule, emphasizes the concept of a statutory ‘maximum.’ . . . I do not understand
its relevance.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 388 (2002)
(“Neither of the two limitations set by Apprendi, pertaining to criminal history and statutory
maxima, respectively, can stand much scrutiny. Each . . . is vulnerable to elimination once an
appropriate vehicle for overturning its supporting precedent arrives at the Court . . . .”).
61. Justices Stevens delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg, while Justice O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468.
62. Ring, 536 U.S. at 585 (holding that the trial judge violated defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights by relying on a judicial finding of fact to authorize the death penalty).
63. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–05 (2004). See also infra Part II.A.
64. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 327 (2005). See also infra Part II.B.
65. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348–49 (2012); See infra Part II.D.
66. See infra Part II.
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II. THE EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION OF APPRENDI’S RULE
A.

Blakely v. Washington

Four years after its decision in Apprendi, the Court in Blakely v.
Washington re-affirmed and clarified its previous holding, especially with
regard to the definition of “statutory maximum.” Like in Apprendi, the
defendant in Blakely pleaded guilty to an offense that by statute could not be
punished with a sentence of more than ten years.67 However, the trial judge,
acting in accordance with the state of Washington’s statute68 allowing the
imposition of “a sentence above the standard range if he finds ‘substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence,’”69 found that the
defendant had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” which was a statutorily
permissible ground for enhancement of the sentence beyond the ten-year
limit.70 Relying on this finding, the trial court sentenced the defendant to more
than three years above the fifty-three-month statutory maximum, which the
Court overturned on appeal.71
Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion, wrote that “the ‘statutory
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant.”72 Moreover, the “statutory maximum” is not the maximum
sentence allowed after a judicial finding of additional facts; instead, it is the
maximum penalty the judge may impose without any additional findings.73
Finally, and maybe most relevant to the issue of restitution, the Court stated
that “every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury
all facts legally essential to the punishment.”74
This is the first case in the Apprendi line with language strongly relevant to
federal restitution law. To preface this, even though the criminal statutes in
Apprendi and Blakely happened to be state statutes in New Jersey and
Washington, respectively, these rulings will still apply to cases where the
statute in question is federal.75 If restitution under the MVRA is a criminal

67. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
68. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (West 1998).
69. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
70. Id. at 300.
71. Id. at 303, 305.
72. Id. at 303.
73. Id. at 303–04.
74. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
75. This is the case because Apprendi and Blakely were using the Fourteenth Amendment as
a vehicle to incorporate the requirements of the Sixth Amendment against the state statutes in
question. Because the Sixth Amendment as written was already applicable against the federal
government, it follows that these ruling would also apply to federal statutes.
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penalty or punishment,76 it is clear that the “facts legally essential to the
punishment” have not been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; the
procedural statute for the imposition of restitution orders under the MVRA
simply requires the probation officer to compile a post-trial, post-conviction,
pre-sentence report that will be used by the court in formulating its restitution
order.77 Moreover, the MVRA also provides that “[a]ny dispute as to the
proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the
preponderance of the evidence.”78 This is especially relevant because, while
the underlying conviction or guilty plea may sometimes be enough to support a
restitution order, it is far more common for the order to be based on a
“bureaucratically prepared, hearsay-riddled presentence [report].”79 Given that
restitution is allowed for a variety of harms, most of which, while they may
come as a result of the underlying offense, are not essential elements of the
offense, the facts surrounding these harms are unlikely to be brought up during
trial or admitted to in a guilty plea, let alone proven beyond a reasonable doubt
to a jury.80
B.

United States v. Booker

Because the Sixth Amendment is applicable (and has been since its
inception) against the federal government on its own,81 the Court began
hearing cases in which a federal statute implicated Apprendi. In United States
v. Booker, the Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were
mandatory at the time,82 violated the jury trial requirements of the Sixth
Amendment.83 The defendant’s case was illustrative of the then-mandatory
nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; the defendant was convicted of
possessing at least fifty grams of crack cocaine, enough to support a sentence
of 210 to 262 months of imprisonment.84 However, defendant’s actual sentence
was 360 months, nearly ten years longer than the Guidelines range supported
by the jury verdict alone.85 Relying on evidence presented during the
sentencing hearing, but after the jury trial, the trial judge found that the

76. See infra Part III.A. See also Kleinhaus, supra note 17, at 2729–33.
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (2006).
78. Id. § 3664(e) (emphasis added).
79. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 304 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
80. In fact, the absence of these facts at trial are often the basis for appeal for defendants
claiming that restitution orders violated Apprendi. See infra Part III.
81. See supra note 75.
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
83. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
84. Id. at 235.
85. Id.
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defendant possessed an additional 556 grams of crack cocaine, and used this
finding to support the longer sentence.86
Justice Stevens, writing an opinion for the Court with respect to the
applicability of Apprendi, held that the Sixth Amendment is violated by the
imposition of an enhanced sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact (other than a prior
conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.87
Interestingly, Justice Stevens’s opinion in Booker removed any mention of a
“statutory maximum” when it reaffirmed the Apprendi holding; in his
statement of Apprendi’s rule, he wrote simply that “[a]ny fact . . . which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”88 Further, Justice
Breyer, who had been a dissenter in Apprendi and its progeny to that point,89
wrote the opinion of the Court with respect to the mandatory nature of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.90 Justice Breyer (1) held that the provision of
the Federal Sentencing Act making the Guidelines mandatory did not comport
with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, and (2) severed the offending
provision, making the Guidelines only advisory rather than mandatory.91
Justice Breyer reasoned that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines would lead
to disparate outcomes and evinced Congress’s “unintentional” introduction of
complexity into the sentencing process.92
Booker is important to restitution for two reasons. First, the removal of the
“statutory maximum” language from Apprendi’s rule makes it more intuitive to
apply to restitution. The “statutory maximum” language has been one of the
major roadblocks for the federal Courts of Appeals to apply Apprendi to
restitution orders.93 If the rule eschews that language, which Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Booker does, it follows that the only thing preventing restitution
from coming under Apprendi’s influence is its uncertain status as a civil or
criminal penalty, which has not been definitively addressed by the Supreme

86. Id.
87. Id. at 245.
88. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
89. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 297 (2004).
90. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; Acker, supra note 32, at 806.
91. Id. at 250.
92. Id. at 252–55.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (2005) (finding that criminal
restitution does not violate Apprendi because the MVRA prescribes no “statutory maximum”);
United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the MVRA does not
include a “statutory maximum” that could be increased by a given finding). See also infra Part
III.B.
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Court.94 Further, finding the “mandatory” nature of the Sentencing Guidelines
to be severable as unconstitutional has parallels to the mandatory nature of the
MVRA, and while the specific constitutionality of the MVRA is outside the
scope of this Article, there is an argument to be made using this line of
reasoning.95 For the same reasons cited by Justice Breyer in severing the
mandatory provision in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,96 the fact that the
MVRA places the burden solely on the probation officer97 and judge, at the
exclusion of the jury, to find the facts necessary to order restitution may be a
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement.
C. Oregon v. Ice
While the majority of cases that followed Apprendi expanded the reach of
its rule, not all was well in “Apprendi-land.”98 In Oregon v. Ice, the Court held
in a 5-4 decision that in light of historical practice and the authority of the
states over administration of their criminal justice systems, the Sixth
Amendment does not inhibit states from assigning to judges, rather than to
juries, finding of facts necessary to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent,
sentences for multiple offenses.99 This was a deviation for Justice Ginsburg,
who wrote the majority opinion in Ice despite having joined the majorities in
Apprendi and its progeny to that point.100 Justice Ginsburg, while
acknowledging the “longstanding common-law” practice in which Apprendi’s
rule is rooted, found that the “twin considerations”101 of Apprendi support the
Court’s decision against extending the doctrine to preclude judicial discretion
in these circumstances.102
Justice Ginsburg pointed to a “historical record” demonstrating that the
jury played no role in the decision to impose sentences consecutively or
concurrently,103 citing to multiple treatises indicating that this was the case
both in England before the founding of the United States, as well as in the

94. See generally Kleinhaus, supra note 17.
95. See generally Acker, supra note 32, at 811–16 (arguing that the MVRA in its current
form is unconstitutional due in part to its mandatory nature).
96. Namely, the fact that the Guidelines contemplated only “the judge without the jury,” and
not “the judge working together with the jury” when determining the sentence. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 252–55 (2005).
97. The probation officer prepares the Presentence Report, which is the main resource used
by the judge in fashioning a restitution order.
98. See supra note 11.
99. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 164 (2009).
100. Id. at 162; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 467 (2000); Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 297 (2004); Booker, 543 U.S. at 225.
101. “Historical practice and respect for state sovereignty.” Ice, 555 U.S. at 168.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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early period of American history.104 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg justified the
Court’s reluctance to further extend Apprendi by admitting that if the judge’s
discretion in determining concurrent and consecutive sentences was subject to
a jury’s finding of fact, then determining the details other state initiatives such
as supervised release, drug rehabilitation programs, community service, and
the imposition of fines and restitution would be jeopardized as well.105 This
language would later be used by lower courts as a reason to decline the
extension of Apprendi to criminal fines and restitution, but the Court would
eventually hold to extend the rule to criminal fines.106
The dissent, led by Justice Scalia, did not agree.107 Arguing that Apprendi
presented a “bright-line” rule, he wrote that “[a]ny fact—other than that of a
prior conviction—that increases the maximum punishment to which a
defendant may be sentenced must be admitted by the defendant or proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.”108 He went on to write that “Oregon’s
sentencing scheme allows judges rather than juries to find the fact necessary to
commit defendants to longer prison sentences, and thus directly contradicts
what we held eight years ago and have reaffirmed several times since.”109
Justice Scalia’s dissent provides an excellent template for the argument of
applying Apprendi to criminal restitution. He lays out a syllogism of sorts,
writing that:
The judge in the case could not have imposed a sentence of consecutive prison
terms without making the factual finding that the defendant caused “separate
harms” to the victim by the acts that produced two convictions . . . . There can
thus be no doubt that the judge’s factual finding was “essential to” the
110
punishment he imposed. That “should be the end of the matter.”

If one applies this to restitution, the result would be as follows:
The judge in this case could not have imposed a sentence [that included a
restitution order] without making the factual finding that the defendant caused
[the harms that qualified for restitution under the restitution statute in
question]. There can be no doubt that the judge’s factual finding was

104. Id. at 168–69.
105. Id. at 171–72.
106. Compare United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 34 (1st Cir. 2010) (giving “great
weight” to this language in Ice and characterizing it as “an express statement . . . that it would not
be appropriate to extend Apprendi to criminal fines”), with S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2344, 2351 (2012) (explaining that the language in Ice was dicta, and the Court had never
distinguished one form of penal sanction from another when doing the Apprendi analysis, and
holding that Apprendi applies to the imposition of criminal fines).
107. Ice, 555 U.S. at 173 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
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“essential” to the punishment he imposed. That “should be the end of the
matter.”

Also, while Justice Scalia’s dissent did address the majority’s fears laid out
in its “parade of horribles,”111 which would include the potential implication of
criminal fines and restitution orders under Apprendi, he did not agree with the
level of concern expressed by the majority. Justice Scalia dismissed the
majorities concerns, saying simply that “if these [supervised release,
community service, or drug rehabilitation] courses reduce rather than augment
the punishment that the jury verdict imposes, there is no problem.”112 The
minority’s lack of concern about this possibility bodes well for the inclusion of
restitution under Apprendi, as does the Court’s holding (and the makeup of the
majority) in the next case to be discussed, Southern Union Co. v. United States.
D. Southern Union Co. v. United States: Extending Apprendi to Criminal
Fines
After the Court’s decision in Ice, many commentators speculated that
Apprendi’s reign was at an end and its reach would begin to recede.113
However, in Southern Union Co. v. United States, Justice Sotomayor authored
an opinion for a 6-3 majority that extended Apprendi to the imposition of
criminal fines.114 In Southern Union, the defendant-appellant had been
convicted by a jury of a single count of violating 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) by
storing hazardous waste without a permit “[f]rom on or about September 19,
2002 until on or about October 19, 2004,” a period of 762 days.115 However,
the jury did not find the specific number of days of the defendant’s violation,
nor the duration of any particular violation; while the statute provided a
penalty of “not more than $50,000 for each day of violation,” the jury needed
only to find one day’s violation to return a guilty verdict.116 At sentencing, the
PSR set a maximum fine of $38.1 million, on the basis that the defendant

111. Id. at 177.
112. Ice, 555 U.S. at 177.
113. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy
Nullification” and Other Surreal Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 78 (2011) (“The decision in Ice in 2009 may have signaled the end of
any reliable voting bloc in [the Apprendi] line of cases.”); Mark Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth
Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the Rights of the Accused, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 223,
225–28 (2008–2009) (noting the weakness that Ginsburg defection from the Apprendi majority
put in the further application of the doctrine); Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A
Prescription for Informing Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2223,
2246–47 (2010) (“Ice . . . suggests a waning enthusiasm among the Justices to push Apprendi
beyond its current boundaries.”).
114. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348–49 (2012).
115. Id. at 2349; Acker, supra note 32, at 807.
116. Id.
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violated the statute for each of the 762 days from September 19, 2002, through
October 19, 2004.117 Defendant appealed, and the First Circuit affirmed the
trial court’s order, though using different reasoning to do so.118
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion relied on three main premises: (1) not all
criminal fines are so “petty” as to not trigger the Sixth Amendment’s right to a
jury trial,119 (2) unlike Ice, where the historical record showed that the
imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences for substantially similar
counts of a conviction or guilty plea was at the trial judge’s discretion,120 here
the record supports applying Apprendi to criminal fines because “the
predominant practice was for [facts relating to the amount of criminal fine to
levy] to be alleged in the indictment and proved to the jury,”121 and, perhaps
most importantly, (3) the Court has never distinguished one form of
punishment from another when applying Apprendi’s rule; its decisions
“broadly prohibit judicial fact-finding that increases maximum criminal
‘sentence[s],’ ‘penalties,’ or ‘punishment[s]’—terms that each undeniably
embrace fines.”122
Further, the majority, which included Justice Ginsburg,123 dismissed the
trepidation shown by the Court in Ice to extend Apprendi’s rule to potentially
cover a litany of sentencing programs, including an explicit reference to the
imposition of criminal fines.124 Any fear of the dicta in Ice was quickly
mollified when the Court dropped just one footnote to its Southern Union
opinion, which stated simply:
Ice also stated in dicta that applying Apprendi to consecutive-versusconcurrent sentencing determinations might imperil a variety of sentencing
decisions judges commonly make, including “the imposition of statutorily
prescribed fines.” The Court of Appeals read this statement to mean that
Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines. We think the statement is at most
ambiguous, and more likely refers to the routine practice of judges imposing
fines from within a range authorized by jury-found facts. Such a practice poses
no problem under Apprendi because the penalty does not exceed what the

117. Id.
118. See United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 33–36 (1st Cir. 2010) (affirming trial
court’s sentence and holding that Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines).
119. S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2351–52.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 98–112.
121. S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2353–54.
122. Id. at 2351.
123. Id. at 2348. Recall that Justice Ginsburg had declined to extend Apprendi just three years
before in Ice, and the majority opinion authored by her included the fear of eventually extending
Apprendi to embrace criminal fines as a justification for her holding.
124. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009).
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jury’s verdict permits. In any event, our statement in Ice was unnecessary to
125
the judgment and is not binding.

This is an extremely strong disclaimer and a vehicle to distance the
Southern Union holding from the passage in Ice just three years prior. This
bodes very well for the eventual recognition that Apprendi is applicable to
restitution orders for two reasons: (1) it indicates that Southern Union’s
majority may be open to extending Apprendi further, and (2) it calms any fear
of the stability of the coalition of justices still willing to extend Apprendi to
other punishments.
First, this summary dismissal of a significant portion of the Court’s
justification of its holding in Ice means that the justices making up the sixperson majority in Southern Union are likely willing to extend Apprendi to
other items on that list, which included restitution orders.126 This footnote did
not only disclaim the Court’s previous statement regarding criminal fines; it
referred to the “variety of sentencing decisions” commonly made by judges,
“including ‘the imposition of statutorily prescribed fines.’”127 This shows the
Southern Union majority’s acknowledgement of the entire list from Ice (which
included restitution), as well as its willingness to disregard fear that any on the
list would be seriously imperiled if Apprendi were to be extended to it.
Second, and vital for the potential inclusion of restitution under Apprendi’s
umbrella, the makeup of Southern Union’s majority does not seem precarious
or vulnerable to a significant change by the time the next Apprendi challenge
reaches the Supreme Court.128 Justices Scalia and Thomas have consistently
voted to extend and/or reinforce Apprendi when given the opportunity.129
Justice Ginsburg had done the same until her opinion in Ice;130 however, it
appears that she has abandoned at least a portion of her reservation with regard
to extending the rule to cover the activities listed in that opinion. Finally,
Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Chief Justice Roberts, while only being
on the Court a relatively short time,131 have all shown their willingness to
extend Apprendi further while on the bench.132

125. S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2352 n.5 (citations omitted).
126. Compare Ice, 555 U.S. at 171, with S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2352 n.5.
127. S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2352 n.5 (emphasis added).
128. The majority in Southern Union was made up of Sotomayor, Scalia, Thomas, Kagan,
Ginsburg, and Roberts. Id. at 2348.
129. See supra cases discussed in Part II.
130. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
131. Chief Justice Roberts has served on the Court since 2005; Justice Sotomayor has served
on the Court since 2009; Justice Kagan has served on the Court since 2010.
132. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan both voted to extend Apprendi’s rule in the one case they
have had the opportunity to do so, while Justice Roberts has now twice voted in favor of
extending Apprendi. See S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2348; Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 162 (2009).
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III. APPRENDI AND ITS PROGENY SUPPORT AN EXTENSION OF ITS RULE TO
CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
A.

Restitution is a Criminal Penalty

The first hurdle in the quest to have restitution recognized as a penalty that
requires Sixth Amendment protection under Apprendi is to determine that it is
indeed a criminal penalty, rather than a civil remedy. While the Supreme Court
has not reviewed this specific issue, it has categorized restitution as a criminal
penalty, albeit in a slightly different context. In Kelly v. Robinson, the Court
held that a restitution order made under the VWPA is a criminal penalty, and
not compensation.133 In support of its conclusion, the Court said:
Although restitution does resemble a judgment “for the benefit of” the victim,
the context in which it is imposed undermines that conclusion. The victim has
no control over the amount of restitution awarded or over the decision to award
restitution. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally does not turn
on the victim’s injury, but on the penal goals of the State’s interests in
rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire for
compensation . . . . Because criminal proceedings focus on the State’s interests
in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire for
compensation, we conclude that restitution orders imposed in such proceedings
operate “for the benefit of” the State . . . . The sentence following a criminal
conviction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative interests of the
134
State.

Not only has the Supreme Court spoken on restitution under the VWPA,
but it has also addressed this general subject after the enactment of the MVRA.
In Pasquantino v. United States, the Court held that “[t]he purpose of awarding
restitution in this action is not to [collect a tax], but to mete out appropriate
criminal punishment for that conduct.135 When Pasquantino is read together
with Kelly, it seems likely that the Supreme Court will join the majority of the
federal Courts of Appeals that have found restitution to be a criminal, rather
than civil penalty.136

133. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52–53 (1986); Acker, supra note 32, at 822.
134. Id. at 52.
135. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 365 (2005).
136. Compare United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1217–18 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that
restitution is a civil, not criminal, remedy), United States v. Bonner, 522 F.3d 804, 807 (7th Cir.
2008), United States v. Millot, 433 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that restitution orders
“are not in the nature of a criminal penalty”), and United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1279–
80 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that purpose of restitution under VWPA “is not to punish . . . but
rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their losses”),
with United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122–23 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing thencurrent state of circuit split and recognizing that the majority of circuits classify restitution as a
criminal penalty), and United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 334–35 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2006) (en
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In the years prior to the Court’s decision in Southern Union, the federal
Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that judges may order restitution based
on judge-found facts using a preponderance of the evidence standard at the
sentencing hearing;137 these courts have given a variety of reasons for
declining to apply Apprendi’s requirement of these facts to be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.138 One such justification given is that restitution,
unlike the sentences of fines, incarcerations, or death, is a civil remedy rather
than a criminal one, and therefore does not even invoke the Sixth
Amendment.139
In United States v. Newman, the Seventh Circuit was the first federal
appellate court to adopt the view that restitution is a civil remedy with a purely
compensatory purpose, as opposed to a criminal remedy with punitive,
retributive, and deterrent goals and effects.140 In a subsequent case, United
States v. Bach, Judge Richard Posner affirmed this view, describing restitution
under the MVRA as a means of “enabl[ing] the tort victim to recover his
damages in a summary proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution,” and
describing the MVRA as “[f]unctionally . . . a tort statute.”141 However, this

banc) (agreeing with the majority of federal Courts of Appeals that hold “restitution ordered as
part of a criminal sentence [to be] criminal rather than civil in nature”). See also Acker, supra
note 32, at 823.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 404 (1st Cir. 2006); United States
v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1311–12
(11th Cir. 2006); Leahy, 438 F.3d at 338–39; United States v. Nichols, 149 Fed. Appx. 149, 153
(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Swanson, 394 F.3d 520, 526 (7th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005) (rehearing en banc
denied); United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2005). All federal
restitution as we currently know it is ordered on judge-found facts on a preponderance standard.
Therefore, each circuit that affirms restitution orders is necessarily endorsing restitution orders
based on judge-found facts on a preponderance standard.
138. The two prevailing justifications for declining to extend Apprendi to restitution are that
(1) restitution is a civil, rather than criminal, remedy, and therefore the Sixth Amendment is not
implicated by restitution orders, and (2) because the federal restitution statutes provide for
restitution for the “full amount of the victim’s losses,” there is no “statutory maximum” that
would implicate Apprendi and the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee. A discussion of (1)
immediately follows this footnote; see infra Part III.B for a discussion of (2).
139. See, e.g., Wolfe, 701 F.3d at 1217–18 (holding that restitution is a civil, not criminal,
remedy); Bonner, 522 F.3d at 807; Millot, 433 F.3d at 1062 (stating that restitution orders “are
not in the nature of a criminal penalty”); Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1279–80 (stating that purpose of
restitution under VWPA “is not to punish . . . but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest
extent possible, are made whole for their losses”).
140. United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 537–42 (7th Cir. 1998). However, since the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Newman, only two other circuits have held restitution to be a civil,
rather than criminal, remedy. See Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1279–80; Millot, 433 F.3d at 1062.
141. United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999).
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was inconsistent not only with Supreme Court jurisprudence,142 but with
precedent from the Seventh Circuit itself: Judge Posner’s Bach opinion did not
reference or attempt to distinguish an earlier case from the Seventh Circuit,
United States v. Fountain, in which Posner (also the author of the Fountain
opinion) described “‘restitution’ in criminal law” as “the earliest criminal
remedy . . . sanctioned not only by history but also by its close relationship to
the retributive and deterrent purposes of criminal punishment.”143 Moreover,
these two cases concerned two different federal restitution statutes,144 a
potentially plausible basis for holding them to a different standard but for the
Seventh Circuit’s own words in Newman in which it stated “restitution cannot
be punishment under only one statute but not the other.”145
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Southern Union did not alter
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in the recent case United States v. Wolfe.146 In
Wolfe, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its prior decisions in Newman and Bach
and explicitly declined to extend Apprendi to restitution, maintaining that it is a
civil remedy that does not invoke the Sixth Amendment.147 However, this case
should not be considered instructive for two reasons. First, while the opinion
states that Apprendi questions are generally decided de novo in the Seventh
Circuit,148 the defendant did not make an Apprendi argument at trial, and
therefore his appeal was reviewed for plain error, a standard of review much
more deferential to the trial judge than de novo.149 Second, Seventh Circuit
case law establishes the requirement of a “compelling reason” to overrule its
precedent,150 and while acknowledging that its view that restitution is a civil
remedy rather than criminal is a minority view among the federal Courts of
Appeals, “[b]eing in the minority is not enough” to change its established
precedent.151 Because the few circuits that have ruled similarly to the Seventh
Circuit have similar standards of review,152 it is unlikely that they will change

142. See supra Parts II.B, II.D.
143. United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 800 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Kleinhaus, supra
note 17, at 2750–53.
144. In Fountain, the statute in question was the VWPA, compared to Bach where the MVRA
was being analyzed.
145. Newman, 144 F.3d at 539.
146. United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1206 (7th Cir. 2012).
147. Id. at 1215–18.
148. Id. at 1216.
149. Id. However, the opinion goes on to state that the result would have likely been the same
using either standard. Id.
150. Wolfe, 701 F.3d at 1217.
151. Id. at 1217.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012) (declining to extend
Apprendi to restitution on a plain error standard of review because defendant did not raise issue at
trial).
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positions without some action on the issue by the Supreme Court, which has
more than one precedent describing restitution as a criminal penalty.153
Despite this minority view in the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, all
other federal Courts of Appeals that have ruled on this issue have held that
restitution is indeed a criminal remedy that serves a punitive and deterrent
purpose.154 These circuits have justified this conclusion using slightly different
analyses, but the common threads between them are (1) reliance on Supreme
Court precedent that has discussed the status of restitution as a criminal
punishment,155 and (2) analyzing the history and purpose of restitution, both
generally and in the context of the federal statutes at issue on appeal.156
The Third Circuit in United States v. Leahy illustrates these analyses.157 In
Leahy, both the majority and a substantial dissent agreed that the Supreme
Court’s language in Kelly v. Robinson and Pasquantino v. United States
supported the conclusion that restitution should be considered a criminal
penalty for Sixth Amendment purposes.158 Quoting Pasquantino, the dissent
recognized that “[t]he purpose of awarding restitution in this action [was] . . .
to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct,”159 and cited the
primary objectives of the defendants’ prosecution as “‘deterrence and
punishment’ of criminal conduct, not ensuring compensation for the
victims.”160 Further, the Leahy court affirmed and cited to a previous case
holding that the VWPA and MVRA “specifically [indicate] that restitution
orders are penalties that a district court may impose when sentencing a
defendant,”161 and that “[r]estitution orders have long been treated as part of

153. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36.
154. A large majority of federal Courts of Appeals characterize various restitution statutes as
criminal sanctions. See United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122–23 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2007)
(discussing then-current state of circuit split and recognizing that the majority of circuits classify
restitution as a criminal penalty); United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 334–35 & n.9 (3d Cir.
2006) (en banc).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36.
156. In federal courts, these are almost universally the VWPA and the MVRA.
157. Leahy, 438 F.3d at 328 (declining to extend Apprendi to restitution because the
restitution statute contained no “statutory maximum”). The majority in Leahy held federal
restitution to be a criminal, rather than civil, penalty. Id. at 335 (majority opinion). A five-judge
dissent agreed with the majority’s analysis on this point, but would have ruled that Apprendi
required the facts supporting restitution orders to be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.
Id. at 347–48 (McKee, J., dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 341–43 (McKee, J., dissenting in part) (recognizing that classifying restitution as a
criminal penalty was “required by the Supreme Court’s earlier decision[s]” in Kelly and
Pasquantino).
159. Id. at 341 (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 350 (2005)) (emphasis
added).
160. Id. at 341–42.
161. Id. (affirming United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 159 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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the sentence for the offense of conviction.”162 These holdings make a
compelling case for classifying restitution as a criminal penalty.
Additionally, there are several pieces of legislative history for both the
VWPA and MVRA that evince Congress’s intent that restitution orders arising
from these statutes be considered for their punitive and deterrent effects.163 The
VWPA’s Senate report discusses restitution as “an integral part of virtually
every formal system of criminal justice,”164 and cites the “provi[sion of]
maximum rehabilitative incentives to the offender” as the reason for the
VWPA’s flexibility in ordering restitution.165 Similarly, the purpose section of
the MVRA’s Senate report cites both the debt a defendant must pay to his or
her victim alongside the debt the defendant pays to society at large as
components of an order of restitution.166 Finally, the Congressional Record
contains statements from multiple United States senators that highlight the
“important penalogical [sic] function”167 of restitution, as well as
acknowledging the MVRA as a “formidable deterrent to crime.”168
In the face of both Supreme Court precedent and the substantial legislative
history of the VWPA and MVRA that indicate Congress’s intent that
restitution orders have a substantial punitive, deterrent, rehabilitative, and
retributive effect, it seems clear that restitution is indeed a criminal remedy that
should be classified as such when applying the Apprendi rule.
The circuits holding that restitution is a criminal remedy have still declined
to extend Apprendi to restitution, however, by determining that the federal
restitution statutes have no “statutory maximum” to exceed, therefore making
them ineligible for Sixth Amendment protection under Apprendi and its
progeny.
B.

Blakely, Booker, and Southern Union Have Eliminated the “Statutory
Maximum” Justification for Excluding Restitution from Apprendi’s Rule

Most of the federal Courts of Appeals have found restitution to be a
criminal penalty; however, they decline to extend Apprendi to restitution for
another reason. In United States v. Day, the Fourth Circuit summarized this
reason as follows: restitution, being mandatory for “the full extent of the
victim’s harm” in the MVRA,169 has no “statutory maximum” as defined by

162. Leahy, 438 F.3d at 341 (affirming Syme, 276 F.3d at 159).
163. See Kleinhaus, supra note 17, at 2762 n.378 (summarizing the legislative history of the
VWPA and MVRA that indicates Congress’s intent for restitution to be a criminal punishment).
164. S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 10 (1982).
165. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
166. S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1995).
167. 141 CONG. REC. S38,451 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
168. Id. at S38,460 (statement of Sen. McCain).
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2006).
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the Apprendi line of cases, and therefore no finding by a judge can go beyond
any maximum.170 This still occurs in spite of the evolution of the Supreme
Court’s recitation of its Apprendi rule,171 which has removed most vestiges of
the “statutory maximum” requirement, instead making clear that “[a]ny
fact . . . which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”172
However, federal Courts of Appeals have largely ignored this shift in the
Supreme Court’s rule language, and have declined applying Apprendi to
restitution orders on the grounds that the MVRA contains no “prescribed
maximum penalty,” and therefore escapes Apprendi’s reach.173
The circuits that have held this way have denied that Blakely altered the
meaning of the term “statutory maximum” within the rule of Apprendi.174
While the Eighth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in finding that restitution
does not violate Apprendi because the MVRA prescribes no “statutory
maximum,”175 it did so in spite of the Supreme Court’s own change in its
definition of the term,176 and in the face of a dissent by one of the judges
hearing the case.177 The dissent wrote that “after the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Blakely v. Washington, [the question of whether
restitution is a criminal penalty that can be ‘increased . . . beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum’] becomes no longer difficult to answer.”178
Despite the general acknowledgement among the federal circuits that Blakely
had altered the understanding of “statutory maximum,” the analysis set forth in
Carruth is still the preferred choice of courts that do not wish to apply
Apprendi to the facts underlying restitution orders.
On November 29, 2012, the Fourth Circuit was one of the first Courts of
Appeals to speak on the issue after Southern Union was decided earlier that
year. In United States v. Day,179 the defendant was convicted of wire fraud,
170. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is no
prescribed statutory maximum in the restitution context; the amount of restitution that a court
may order is instead indeterminate and varies based on the amount of damage and injury caused
by the offense.”) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“[R]estitution is not subject to Apprendi because the statutes authorizing restitution, unlike
ordinary penalty statutes, do not provide a determinate statutory maximum.”).
171. See supra Part II.B.
172. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 900 (8th Cir. 2005) (rehearing en banc denied).
174. See, e.g., Reifler, 446 F.3d at 118; Carruth, 418 F.3d at 900.
175. Carruth, 418 F.3d at 902–04.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 81–97.
177. Carruth, 418 F.3d at 905 (Bye, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 713 (4th Cir. 2012).
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conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and
conspiracy to commit smuggling.180 The defendant appealed his sentence,
which consisted of incarceration, fines, forfeitures, and restitution; the fines
and restitution orders amounted to more than nine million dollars.181 While the
court correctly justified the three million dollar fine under the framework of
Southern Union,182 it declined to overturn the defendant’s restitution order,
stating that:
Critically, however, there is no prescribed statutory maximum in the restitution
context; the amount of restitution that a court may order is instead
indeterminate and varies based on the amount of damage and injury caused by
the offense. As a consequence, the rule of Apprendi is simply not implicated to
begin with by a trial court’s entry of restitution. As the Sixth Circuit aptly
explained in United States v. Sosebee, “restitution is not subject to [Apprendi]
because the statutes authorizing restitution, unlike ordinary penalty statutes, do
not provide a determinate statutory maximum.” That logic was sound when
183
written before Southern Union, and it remains so today.

The Day court’s reliance on a statute’s status as “indeterminate” or
“vari[able] based on the amount of damage and injury caused by the offense”
is misplaced. This logic is dependent on the Supreme Court’s endorsement that
any form of punishment184 that is “indeterminate” need not be subject to
Apprendi’s rule. The Court has explicitly rejected this line of reasoning. In
Southern Union, the Court made it clear that the rule of Apprendi applies to all
“‘sentence[s],’ ‘penalties,’ or ‘punishments’” regardless of the type of facts
required to support said sentence, penalty, or punishment.185 Further, it
specifically addressed these “indeterminate” types of statutes, stating that even
where the amount of a fine is calculated using the “amount of the defendant’s
gain or the victim’s loss,”186 “[a jury finding these facts beyond a reasonable
doubt] is necessary to implement Apprendi ‘s animating principle: the
preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark between the State and the
180. Id. at 716. The defendant, Roger Day Jr., was found to be the “mastermind of a multimillion dollar scheme to defraud the Department of Defense.” Id.
181. Id. at 731–33.
182. The court correctly pointed out that the defendant’s own admissions had established that
he had received a gain of at least $2.16 million; the statute in question subjected the defendant to
fines up to “twice the gross gain” produced by the offense. Id. at 731–32. The defendant’s
admission to this fact was key, because Apprendi’s rule (as stated by the Court in Southern
Union) precludes only “judicial fact-finding that enlarges the maximum punishment a defendant
faces beyond what the jury’s verdict or the defendant’s admissions allow.” S. Union Co. v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2352 (2012).
183. Day, 700 F.3d at 732 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
184. See S.Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2351 (“In stating Apprendi’s rule, we have never distinguished
one form of punishment from another.”).
185. Id. at 2350–51.
186. Id. at 2351.
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accused at the trial for an alleged offense.”187 Thus, it is clear that there is no
intelligible distinction between statutes with “determinate” amounts of
punishment as opposed to “indeterminate” amounts of punishment; if any
punishment is inflicted, the facts that support that punishment must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
Since the Court first established the specific form of protection the Sixth
Amendment affords criminal defendants under Apprendi, it embarked upon a
slow, steady march to include all forms of criminal sentences under its reach.
The Court has generally shown little fear in extending Apprendi to cover more
forms of “punishments” and “penalties” in the application of its rule. Given the
recent choice of language used by the Court in its Apprendi jurisprudence, I
believe that the inclusion of restitution under the moniker of “punishment” is
inevitable. The reasons given by the circuit courts for declining to extend
Apprendi are tenuous at best, and given the expansive nature of the opinions in
the Apprendi line of cases (as well as the current Supreme Court language that
describes restitution) it seems very likely that restitution will be the newest
resident of “Apprendi-land” in the not-so-distant future.
What happens next will be an interesting occurrence in itself. If Apprendi
is indeed applied to restitution, what will become of the current sentencing
procedure under the federal statutes? Will the prosecution be compelled to
introduce the evidence necessary to support a restitution order at trial, or will
the jury be held over to perform its duty at a sentencing hearing? Will an
entirely new jury be selected for use at the sentencing hearing? The
implications on the sentencing procedure are profound, and will be sure to
spark protest from prosecutors and judges nation-wide. In the words of Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Apprendi, “[we cannot operate on the] erroneous and
all-too-common assumption that the Constitution means what we think it ought
to mean. It does not; it means what it says.”188 If it says that all facts that
support criminal punishments or penalties must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the criminal justice system will just have to play along.
JAMES M. BERTUCCI

187. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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